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Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to the literature by applying the Granger-causality approach and endogenous 
breakpoint test to offer an operational definition of contagion to examine European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) countries public debt behaviour. A database of yields on 10-year 
government bonds issued by 11 EMU countries covering fourteen years of monetary union is used.  
The main results suggest that the 41 new causality patterns, which appeared for the first time in the 
crisis period, and the intensification of causality recorded in 70% of the cases, provide clear 
evidence of contagion in the aftermath of the current euro debt crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
From the introduction of the euro in January 1999 until the collapse of the US financial 
institution Lehman Brothers in September 2008, sovereign yields of euro area issues moved 
in a narrow range with only very slight differences across countries (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Nevertheless, following the Lehman Brothers collapse severe tensions emerged in financial 
markets worldwide, including the euro zone bond market. In fact, not only did the period 
of financial turmoil turn into a global financial crisis, but it also began to spread to the real 
sector, with a rapid, synchronized deterioration in most major economies. This financial 
crisis put the spotlight on the macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances within European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries which had largely been ignored during 
the period of stability when markets had seemed to underestimate the possibility that 
governments might default (see Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). Furthermore, in some EMU 
countries, problems in the banking sector spread to sovereign states because of their 
excessive debt issues made in order to save the financial industry; eventually, the global 
financial crisis grew into a full-blown sovereign debt crisis. Indeed, since 2010, Greece has 
been bailed out twice and Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus have also needed bailouts to stay 
afloat. These events brought to light the fact that the origin of sovereign debt crises in the 
euro area varies according to the country and reflects the strong interconnection between 
public and private debt (see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013) 1. 
 
In this scenario, some of the research to date has focused on the analysis of interactions 
between the sovereign market and the financial sector [see Mody (2009), Ejsing and Lemke 
(2009), Gennaioli et al. (2013), Broner et al. (2011), Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and 
Andenmatten and Brill (2011)]. Other researchers have discussed transmission and/or 
contagion between sovereigns in the euro area context [see Kalbaska and Gatkowski 
                                                          
1 Moro (2013) and Aizenman (2013) offer a literature review on the Eurozone economic and financial crisis. 
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(2012), Metiu (2012), Caporin et al. (2013), Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) and Gorea and 
Radev (2014) to name a few]. Finally, a strand of research has examined structural breaks 
and sovereign credit risk in the Eurozone [see, e. g., Basse et al. (2012), Gruppe and Lange 
(2013) and Basse (2013)]. 
 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the last two branches of the literature by 
examining not only the transmission of sovereign risk, but also the contagion in euro area 
public debt markets. In the literature there is a considerable amount of ambiguity 
concerning the precise definition of contagion. There is no theoretical or empirical 
definition on which researchers agree and, consequently, the debate on exactly how to 
define contagion is not just academic, but also has important implications for measuring 
the concept and for evaluating policy responses. Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) note five 
definitions of contagion used in the literature. Two of them have been predominantly used 
in empirical studies to analyze it in financial markets and have been adopted in common 
usage by governments, citizens and policymakers. The first defines contagion depending on 
the channels of transmission that are used to spread the effects of the crisis, whilst the 
second defines it depending on whether the transmission mechanisms are stable through 
time.  
 
Masson (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) apply the first definition, which argues 
that contagion arises when common shocks and all channels of potential interconnection 
are either not present or have been controlled for. So, the term contagion will only be 
applied when a crisis in one country may conceivably trigger a crisis elsewhere for reasons 
unexplained by macroeconomic fundamentals2 – perhaps because it leads to shifts in 
                                                          
2 The theory of “monsoonal effects” suggests that financial crises appear to be contagious because underlying 
macroeconomic variables are correlated. In this context, several important papers have focused on the macroeconomic 
causes of crises, for example, Eichengreen et al. (1996). 
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market sentiment, or changes the interpretation given to existing information. According to 
the second definition, which was proposed in a seminal paper by Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002), contagion is a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one 
country (or group of countries)3. Therefore, if two markets show a high degree of co-
movement during periods of stability, even if they continue to be highly correlated after a 
shock to one market, this may not constitute contagion, but only the outcome of the 
“interdependence” that has always been present in the markets. The empirical analysis of 
Forbes and Rigobon definition of contagion implies then the presence of a tranquil, pre-
crisis period in order to be able to examine whether a change in the intensity of the 
transmission has occurred after the shock. 
 
In this paper, we will use an operational approach based on the second of these definitions4 
in order to capture the phenomenon of contagion quantitatively. Besides, among the five 
general strategies5 that have been used in the literature, our analysis will be related to one of 
the most conventional methodologies for testing for contagion: the analysis of cross-
market correlations. However, we not only investigate changes in cross-market 
interdependencies via cointegration analysis, but also explore changes in the existence and 
direction of causality by means of a Granger-causality approach6 before and after 
endogenously (data-based) identified crises. Hence, the definition of contagion that we will 
explore in the remainder of this paper is the following: an abnormal increase in the number 
                                                          
3 The distinction between contagion which occurs at times of crisis, and interdependence which is a result of normal 
market interaction, has become the focal point of many contagion studies: see for example Corsetti et al. (2005) or Bae et 
al. (2003).  
4 In a very recent paper, Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014), analyze contagion using an approach that is based in the 
first definition of contagion [(Masson, 1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) among others]. Concretely, they examine 
whether the transmission of the recent crisis in euro area sovereign debt markets was due to fundamentals-based or pure 
contagion. Their results suggest the importance of both variables proxying market sentiment and macrofundamentals in 
determining contagion and underline the coexistence of “pure contagion” and “fundamentals-based contagion” during 
the recent European debt crisis.  
5 Probability analysis, cross-market correlations, VAR models, latent factor/GARCH models, and extreme value/co-
exceedance/jump approach (see Forbes, 2012). 
6 Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggest the use of this methodology when they point out that, if the source of the crisis is 
not well identified and endogeneity may be severe, it may be useful to utilize Granger-causality tests to determine the 
extent of any feedback from each country in the sample to the initial crisis country. 
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or in the intensity of causal relationships, compared with that of tranquil periods, triggered 
after an endogenously detected shock. 
 
Most studies in the literature investigate changes in cross-market correlations (see, e. g., 
Syllignakis and Kouretas, 2011); very few explore changes in the existence and direction of 
causality. Exceptions are studies by Edwards (2000) who focuses on Chile, Baig and 
Goldfajn (2001) who investigate contagion from Russia to Brazil, Gray (2009) who 
examines spillovers in Central and Eastern European countries, and both Granger et al. 
(2000) and Sander et al. (2003) who investigate spillovers during the Asian crisis. However, 
a small number of studies have applied a Granger-causality approach to the investigation of 
changes in the existence and direction of transmission in euro area debt markets. Among 
them, Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012) analyze the dynamics of the credit default swap 
(CDS) market of peripheral EMU countries along with three central European countries 
(France, Germany and the UK) for the period of 2008–2010, and Gómez-Puig and 
Sosvilla-Rivero (2013) focus on the existence of possible Granger-causal relationships 
between the evolution of the yield of bonds issued solely by peripheral EMU countries 
during the period 1999-2010.   
 
Therefore, our study contributes to this literature by applying a Granger-causality approach 
to 10-year sovereign yields7 of both peripheral and central EMU countries8 on an extended 
time period spanning from the inception of the euro in January 1999, well before the global 
financial and sovereign debt crises, until December 2012. But, unlike previous studies in 
the literature (see Sander et al., 2003 o Kalbaska and Gatkowski, 2012), we do not set a 
                                                          
7 Our analysis focuses on 10-year yields instead of CDS since CDS data are not available for all the countries in the study 
until late 2008 - only one year before the onset of the euro sovereign debt crisis. 
8 Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2013) report data of consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis provided by 
the Bank for International Settlements by nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims on each 
country. These data suggest that the problems of peripheral countries can trigger contagion which may affect not only 
other peripheral countries but also central EMU countries, since some of these banks (mostly German and French banks) 
are highly exposed to the debt of peripheral countries. 
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specific breakpoint based on a priori knowledge of the potential break date. In our analysis, 
we use two techniques that take into consideration that the timing of the break is unknown 
and allow the data to indicate when regime shifts occur. Thus, break dates that identify the 
shock triggering contagion are determined endogenously by the model in each of the 
potential pair-wise causal relationships9. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the econometric 
methodology. The dataset used to analyze causality is described in Section 3. Section 4 
presents the empirical findings, whilst Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Econometric methodology 
 
2.1 Testing for causality 
Granger’s (1969) causality test is widely used to test for the relationship between two 
variables. A variable X is said to Granger-cause another variable Y if past values of X help 
predict the current level of Y better than past values of Y alone, indicating that  past values 
of X have some informational content that is not present in past values of Y. This 
definition is based on the concept of causal ordering: two variables X and Y may be 
contemporaneously correlated by chance, but it is unlikely that the past values of X will be 
useful in predicting Y, giving all past values of Y10. 
 
                                                          
9 In the analysis we only analyze shock transmission between pairs, considering in each test that only one country is 
responsible of spreading the shock. Unlike previous crisis, since in the euro area sovereign debt crisis several peripheral 
countries entered a fiscal crisis at roughly the same time, it is very difficult to identify the country responsible of the origin 
of the shock.  
10 Granger causality is not identical to causation in the classical philosophical sense, but it demonstrates the likelihood of 
this causation more forcefully than contemporaneous correlation (Geweke, 1984). 
  
7 
Granger-causality tests are sensitive to lag length and, therefore, it is important to select the 
appropriate lengths11. Otherwise, the model estimates will be inconsistent and the 
inferences drawn may be misleading (see Thornton and Batten, 1985). In this paper, we use 
Hsiao’s (1981) generalization of the Granger notion of causality. Hsiao proposed a 
sequential method to test for causality, which combines Akaike (1974)’s final predictive 
error (FPE, from now on) and the definition of Granger-causality (Canova 1995, 62-63). 
Essentially, the FPE criterion trades off the bias that arises from underparameterization of 
a model against the loss in efficiency that results from its overparameterization.  
Consider the following models,  
 t 0
1
M
i t i t
i
Y Y  

                          (1)        
0
1 1
M N
t i t i j t j t
i j
Y Y X    
 
                       (2)       
where Xt and Yt are covariance-stationary variables [i.e., they are I(0) variables]. The 
following steps are used to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing causality: 
i) Treat Yt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (1), and compute its FPE with 
the order of lags mi varying from 1 to M. Examine the FPE  
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 where T is the total number of observations and SSR is the sum of squared 
 residuals of OLS regression (1). Choose mi for the value of m that minimizes the 
 FPE, say m, and denote the corresponding value as FPEY (m, 0). 
ii) Treat Yt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Xt as a 
manipulated variable as in (2). Compute again the FPE of (2) by varying the order 
of lags ni of Xt from 1 to N. Examine the FPE 
                                                          
11 The general principle is that the smaller lag length has smaller variance but runs a risk of bias, while larger lags will 
reduce the bias problem but may lead to inefficiency. 
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 Choose the order ni which gives the smallest FPE, say n, and denote the 
 corresponding FPE as FPEY (m,n). 
iii) Compare FPEY (m, 0) with FPEY (m,n) [i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step (i) 
with the smallest FPE in step (ii)]. If FPEY (m,0)-FPEY (m,n)>0, then Xt is said to 
cause Yt. If FPEY (m,0)-FPEY (m,n)<0, then Yt is an independent process. 
iv) Repeat steps i) to iii) for the Xt variable, treating Yt as the manipulated variable. 
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables, but are first-difference stationary [i.e., they are 
I(1) variables] and cointegrated (see Dolado et al., 1990), it is possible to investigate the 
causal relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from ∆Yt  to ∆Xt, using the following error 
correction models: 
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where Zt is the OLS residual of the cointegrating regression ( t tY X   ), known as the 
error-correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I(1) variables but are not cointegrated, 
then β in (3) and (4) is assumed to be equal to zero. 
 
In both cases [i.e., Xt  and Yt  are I(1) variables, and they are or they are not cointegrated], 
we can use Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Yt with ∆Yt and Xt with ∆Xt in steps 
(i) to (iv), as well as substituting expressions (1) and (2) with equations (3) and (4). 
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2.2 Stability Diagnostics 
In the conventional Granger-causality analysis, the relationship between two variables is 
assumed to exist at all times. However, in a context of financial crisis, parameter non-
constancy may occur and may generate misleading inferences if left undetected (see, Bai 
and Perron, 1998, 2003; Perron, 1989; Zivot and Andrews, 1992). Furthermore, the pre-
testing issue in early studies may induce a size distortion of the resulting test procedures 
(Bai, 1997). Thus, it is desirable to let the data select when and where regime shifts occur (i. 
e., we need to test for the null hypothesis of no structural change versus the alternative 
hypothesis that changes are present). To this end, we first identify a single structural change 
using the Quandt–Andrews one-time unknown structural break test. We then use the 
procedure suggested by Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to detect multiple 
unknown breakpoints in order to obtain further evidence of the existence of the 
breakpoints previously detected endogenously. These breakpoints allow the identification 
of pre-crisis and crisis periods for each pair-wise causal relationship which, as explained in 
the Introduction, are needed for the detection of a possible contagion episode according to 
our operational definition based on Forbes and Rigobon (2002) approach. 
 
2.2.1 Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint Test 
A particular challenge in empirical time series analysis is to determine the appropriate 
timing of a potential structural break. In a traditional Chow (1960) test12, we have to set a 
specific breakpoint based on a priori knowledge about the potential break date. In our 
analysis, however, we do not assume any prior knowledge about potential break dates, but 
we make use of a data-based procedure to determine the most likely location of a break. In 
particular, we use the Quandt–Andrews unknown breakpoint test, originally introduced by 
                                                          
12 The basic idea of the breakpoint Chow test is to fit the equation separately for each subsample and to see whether there 
are significant differences in the estimated equations. A significant difference indicates a structural change in the 
relationship.  
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Quandt (1960) and later developed by Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994). 
The idea behind the Quandt-Andrews test is that a single Chow breakpoint test is 
performed at every observation between two dates, or observations (τ1 and τ2). The k test 
statistics from those Chow tests are then summarized into one test statistic for a test 
against the null hypothesis of no breakpoints between τ1 and τ2.   
 
For the unknown break date, Quandt (1960) proposed likelihood ratio test statistics for an 
unknown change point, called Supremum test, while Andrews (1993) supplied analogous 
Wald and Lagrange Multiplier test statistics for it. Then Andrews and Ploberger (1994) 
developed Exponential (LR, Wald and LM) and Average (LR, Wald and LM) tests. These 
tests are calculated by using individual Chow Statistics for each date of the data except for 
some trimmed portion from both ends of it. While the Supremum test finds the date that 
maximizes Chow Statistics, the most possible break point, the Average and Exponential 
tests use all the Chow statistic values and are only informative about the existence of the 
break but not about its date13.  
 
We set a search interval [0.15,0.85]   for the full sample T to allow a minimum of 15% 
of effective observations contained in both pre- and post-break periods. These tests allow 
us to determine a structural change with unknown timing endogenously from the data after 
examining each date of the data except for some trimmed portion from both ends of it. 
 
2.2.2 Multiple Breakpoint Tests 
Bai and Perron (1998) develop tests for multiple structural changes. Their methodology can 
be disentangled in two separate and independent parts. First, they propose a sequential 
method to identify any number of breaks in a time series, regardless of their statistical 
                                                          
13 Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) provide tables of critical values, and Hansen (1997) provides a 
method to calculate p-values.  
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significance. Second, once the breaks have been identified, they propose a series of 
statistics to test for the statistical significance of these breaks, using asymptotic critical 
values. 
 
The sequential procedure is as follows: 
i. Begin with the full sample and perform a test of parameter constancy with 
unknown break. 
ii. If the test rejects the null hypothesis of constancy, determine the breakdate, divide 
the sample into two samples and perform single unknown breakpoint tests in each 
subsample. Add a breakpoint whenever in a subsample null is rejected. 
iii. Repeat the procedure until all of the subsamples do not reject the null hypothesis, 
or until the maximum number of breakpoints allowed or maximum subsample 
intervals to test is reached.  
 
For a specific set of unknown breakpoints 1( ,..., ) ,pT T  we use the following set of tests 
developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to detect multiple structural breaks: the sup F 
type test, the double maximum tests, and the test for   versus 1  breaks. First, we 
consider the sup F type test of no structural breaks ( 0p ) versus the alternative 
hypothesis that there are kp   breaks. Second, we use the double maximum tests, 
UDmax and WDmax, testing the null hypothesis of no structural breaks against an 
unknown number of breaks given some upper bound m*. Finally, the sup   1TF  test, 
which is a sequential test of the null hypothesis of   breaks against the alternative of 1  
breaks. The test is applied to each segment containing the observations 1iTˆ  to iTˆ  
 11  ,,i . To run these tests it is necessary to decide the minimum distance between 
two consecutive breaks, h, which is obtained as the integer part of a trimming parameter, 
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ε , multiplied by the number of observations T (we use 150.ε   and allow up to four 
breaks). 
 
2.3 Testing for Causality Intensification 
As stated above, Granger causality measures precedence and information content.  
Therefore, the statement “X Granger causes Y” implies that past values of X provide 
relevant and valuable information about the future behaviour of Y that is not present in 
past values of Y. 
  
Since the statistic we use to detect Granger-causality is FPEY (m,0)-FPEY (m,n), we can 
compute this statistic before and after the endogenously identified breakpoint, and thus 
assess the intensification or reduction in the causal relationship for those pairs in which we 
have found Granger-causality in both periods. Therefore, we take an increase of Granger 
causality as an amplification of the statistical predictability of one time series for another as 
evidence of an intensification in the transmission mechanism between them. 
 
To this end, for each pair-wise relationship where we find causality both in the tranquil and 
in the crisis periods, we compare FPEY (m,0)-FPEY (m,n) in these periods. If this statistic is 
higher in the crisis than in the tranquil period, we can conclude that an intensification in 
the causal relationship has taken place. Indeed, this result shows that in the crisis period, 
even though the uncertainty is by definition higher, the Xt (or ∆Xt) in equation (2) [or in 
equation (4)] contains relatively more useful information for forecasting the Yt (or ∆Yt) 
which is not contained in past values of Yt (or  ∆Yt), than during the pre-crisis period. 
Conversely, if this statistic is lower in the crisis period than in the tranquil one, we can infer 
a reduction in the causal relationship, since the extra lagged variables are less useful now 
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for providing information about the future behaviour of the yield under study during the 
crisis period than during the pre-crisis period.  
 
In doing so, we are first evaluating the “forecast conditional efficiency” in the terminology 
of Granger and Newbold (1973, 1986) [or “forecast encompassing” according to Chong 
and Hendry (1986) and Clements and Hendry (1993)] of the manipulated variable Xt (or 
∆Xt) in equation (2) [or equation (4)] for each period, by examining whether Xt (or ∆Xt) 
contains useful information for forecasting the Yt (or  ∆Yt) which is not contained in past 
values of Yt (or  ∆Yt), and then comparing them and assessing the relative gains in forecast 
accuracy in each period. 
 
3. Data  
We use daily data of 10-year bond yields from January 1st 1999 to December 31st 2012 
collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream for EMU-11 countries: both central (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) and peripheral countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
[Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here] 
Figure 1 plots the evolution of daily 10-year bond yields for each country in our sample, 
whilst Figure 2 displays the evolution of their spread against the German bund. A simple 
look at these figures allows us to identify two periods, although the breakpoint is not the 
same in all countries. Between January 1999 and summer 2008, the 10-year bond yields of 
different countries were evolving simultaneously, and spreads presented only small 
differences across countries. Only at the end of this period, following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, did the major tensions emerging in the financial 
markets worldwide affect the euro area sovereign debt market since, in a context in which 
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the crisis had already reached the real sector, the problems in the banking sector began to 
spread to euro area sovereign states.  
 
The descriptive statistics of the 10-year government bond yields in EMU countries during 
the sample period, (not reported here to save space, but available from the authors upon 
request) suggest that the mean is not significantly different from zero for the first 
differences and that normality is strongly rejected for both the levels and first differences. 
Our results also indicate the presence of heteroskedaticity, in line with the findings by 
Favero and Missale (2012) and Groba et al. (2013) among many others.  
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Preliminary analysis 
As a first step, we tested for the order of integration of the 10-year bond yields by means of 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. Then, following Cheung and Chinn (1997)’s 
suggestion, we confirm the results using the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests, where 
the null is a stationary process against the alternative of a unit root. The results, not shown 
here to save space but available from the authors upon request, decisively reject the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity in the first regressions. They do not reject the null 
hypothesis of stationarity in first differences, but strongly reject it in levels, in the second 
ones. So, they suggest that both variables can be treated as first-difference stationary. 
 
As a second step, we tested for cointegration between each of the 55 pair combinations14 
of EMU-11 yields using Johansen (1991, 1995)’s approach. The results suggest15 that only 
                                                          
14 Recall that the number of possible pairs between our sample of EMU-11 yields is given by the following formula 
! 11!
55
!( )! 2!(11 2)!
n
r n r
 
 
 
15 The results are not presented, either, to save space but are available from the authors upon request. 
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for the Austria-Finland, Austria-France, Finland-France, Finland-Netherlands, Greece-
Ireland, Greece-Portugal, Ireland-Italy, Ireland-Portugal, Italy-Netherlands and Italy-
Portugal cases does the trace test indicate the existence of one cointegrating equation at 
least at the 0.05 level. Therefore, for these pairs we test for Granger-causality in the first 
difference of the variables, with an error-correction term added [i. e., equations (3) and (4)], 
whereas for the remaining cases, we test for Granger-causality in the first difference of the 
variables, with no error-correction term added [i. e., equations (3) and (4) with β=0] 
 
4. 2. Detecting structural breakpoints 
As we explained above, in order to detect contagion in the euro area sovereign debt 
markets, we need to identify a tranquil or pre-crisis period. To do so, unlike previous 
studies, we do not set a specific breakpoint based on a priori knowledge about the potential 
break date; first we apply the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint test and let the data select when 
regime shifts occur in each potential causal relationship, and later we confirm the identified 
breakpoint by using the tests developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to detect multiple 
structural breaks16. Table 1 shows that 70% of the total break dates (77 out of the 110 cases 
analysed) can be explained by some of the following five triggering events17: (1) the increase 
in the ECB interest rates by 25 basis points on July 3rd 2008; (2) the Lehman Brothers 
collapse on September 15th 2008; (3) the admission by Papandreou’s government that its 
finances were far worse than in previous announcements in November 2009; (4) Greece’s 
request for financial support on April 23rd 2010; and (5) Ireland’s request of financial 
support on November 21st 2010. 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                          
16 We compute the breakpoint tests using a statistic which is robust to heteroskedasticity, since we estimate our original 
equations with Newey and West (1987) standard errors. 
17 In order to save space, the numerical results of Quandt-Andrews and Bai-Perron tests are not reported in Table 1, but 
they are also available upon request. 
  
16 
These results suggest that not only can most of the breakpoints be explained by systemic 
shocks, but that more than half of them (60 out of 110) are directly connected to the euro 
sovereign debt crisis (triggering events 4 to 5). Besides, 69 out of the 110 breakpoints (i. e., 
63%) occur after November 2009, after Papandreou’s government had disclosed that its 
finances were far worse than previously announced18, with a yearly deficit of 12.7% of 
GDP, four times more than the euro area’s limit (and more than double the previously 
published figure), and a public debt of $410 billion. We should recall that this 
announcement only served to worsen the severe crisis in the Greek economy, and the 
country’s debt rating was lowered to BBB+ (the lowest in the euro zone) on December 8th. 
These episodes marked the beginning of the euro area sovereign debt crisis. 
 
Furthermore, it is also notable that all break dates, including the 30% which are not related 
to one of the five triggering events mentioned above19, occur between January 2008 and 
December 2010, suggesting that systemic rather than idiosyncratic factors explain euro area 
sovereign debt market turmoil. Therefore, since the precise regime shift date changes 
depending on the causal relationship, our analysis improves on previous studies by using in 
each relationship the breakpoint obtained from the Quandt–Andrews and Bai-Perron tests. 
 
4. 3. Changes in the number of Granger-causal relationships 
Given the evidence presented in the previous sub-section, in ten relationships (Austria-
Finland, Austria-France, Finland-France, Finland-Netherlands, Greece-Ireland, Greece-
Portugal, Ireland-Italy, Ireland-Portugal, Italy-Netherlands and Italy-Portugal) we test for 
Granger-causality in the first difference of the variables, with an error-correction term 
                                                          
18 These results are in line with Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) who find that none of the variables measuring 
global (world) market sentiment was statistically significant, suggesting that shifts in local (country-specific) or regional 
(European) rather than global market sentiment are behind euro area debt crisis transmission. 
19 We make use of equality tests to formally evaluate the null hypothesis that the mean and variance in the pre-crisis and 
crisis periods are equal against the alternative that they are different. The results (not shown here to save space, but 
available from the authors upon request) indicate strong evidence that they differ across periods.  
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added. In all other cases, we test for Granger-causality in the first difference of the 
variables, with no error-correction term added. The causal relationships resulting from the 
estimated FPE statistics for the pre-crisis and crisis periods jointly with the break dates 
resulting from the Quandt–Andrews and Bai-Perron tests are shown in Tables 2 and 320. 
[Insert Table 2 and Table 3 here] 
The changes in causal relationships in the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis period 
are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 (grey arrows represent relationships that did not exist 
before the breakpoint, whilst discontinuous arrows reflect relationships that disappear with 
the crisis). 
 [Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 here] 
Specifically, Table 2 and Figure 3 present the evolution of the causality running from EMU 
peripheral countries. The behaviour of causality running from EMU peripheral to central 
countries is displayed in Panel A of Table 2 and Figure 3a; whilst Panel B of Table 2 and 
Figure 3b show the evolution of causality running within EMU peripheral countries. 
Likewise, Table 3 and Figure 4 present the changes in causality running from EMU central 
countries. Panel A of Table 3 and Figure 4a illustrate the evolution of causality running 
from EMU central to peripheral countries while Panel B of Table 3 and Figure 4b report 
how causality running within EMU central countries has evolved during the two periods. 
 
As can be seen, for the four subsamples of countries, the number of causal relationships 
increases as the financial and sovereign debt crisis develops in the euro area. If we focus on 
the evolution of causality between EMU peripheral and EMU central countries (Panels A 
of Tables 2 and 3 and Figures 3a and 4a), it can be observed that in the pre-crisis period 
causality is higher if EMU central countries are triggers rather than EMU peripheral 
                                                          
20 These results were confirmed using both Wald statistics to test the joint hypothesis 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ... 0,n       and 
the Williams-Kloot test for forecasting accuracy (Williams, 1959). These additional results are not shown here to save 
space, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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countries. In particular, our results indicate the existence of 19 causal relationships in the 
first case (Figure 4a) and 10 in the second (Figure 3a). Two interesting findings are worth 
pointing out: (1) in the pre-crisis period, the evolution of Greek sovereign yields does not 
Granger-cause that of other EMU central countries, and (2) the Netherlands’ yield 
behaviour is not Granger-caused by the evolution of yields of any EMU peripheral country 
(see Figure 3a). 
 
During the crisis period, even though the number of causal relationships detected increases 
in both directions, they are more frequent when EMU peripheral countries are the triggers.  
We find 27 out of 30 causal relationships when the EMU peripheral countries are the 
triggers (Figure 3a), whilst the number of causality linkages rises from 19 to 24 if the 
triggers are EMU central countries (Figure 4a). Interestingly, Greece now Granger-causes 
Austria, Belgium, Finland and France while Netherlands’ yield behaviour is caused by the 
Spanish and the Irish one. Moreover, another relevant finding is that with the crisis, four 
causal relationships from central to peripheral countries disappear: Austria-Ireland, 
Belgium-Greece, France-Portugal and Netherlands-Ireland, suggesting a temporal 
disconnection between them.  
 
Panel B of Table 2 and Figure 3b, which show the results regarding causal relationships 
running within EMU peripheral countries in the two periods under study, also suggest that 
their number is boosted as the financial and sovereign debt crises expand in the euro area. 
We find evidence of 14 relationships in the pre-crisis period (Figure 3b) and 20 in the crisis 
period. In the pre-crisis period the exceptions are: a) Greece-Ireland, where there is no 
evidence of Granger-causality in either direction, and b) some relationships where we do 
not find unidirectional Granger-causality: from Greece to Italy and Spain, and from 
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Portugal and Spain to Ireland. Nevertheless, we find evidence of bidirectional causality in 
all the relationships during the crisis period. 
 
Finally, Panel B of Table 3 and Figure 4b present the results regarding causality running 
within EMU central countries in the two periods. From these results it can be inferred that 
the number of causal relationships also increases in the crisis period, since we find evidence 
of bidirectional causality in all 15 relationships (Figure 4b). Hence, causality linkages 
increase from 21 to 30 during the crisis compared to the pre-crisis period. 
 
4. 4. Changes in the intensity of Granger-causal relationships 
As mentioned above, for each of the 60 cases where we find causality in both the tranquil 
and the crisis periods, we compare FPEX (m,0)-FPEX (m,n) in the two periods. If this 
statistic is higher in the crisis than in the tranquil period, we can conclude that the causal 
relationship has intensified. Conversely, if this statistic is lower in the crisis period than in 
the tranquil one, we can infer a reduction in the causal relationship. 
 
In the last column in Tables 2 and 3, we report the results of this exploratory exercise. As 
can be seen, even though in the aftermath of the crisis there is an increase in volatility (see 
Figure 1), we obtain evidence of causality intensification with respect to the more stable 
pre-crisis period21. The causing yields improve the forecast accuracy of the caused yields 
during the crisis period compared with the tranquil period, indicating that after the detected 
breakpoint they carry even more useful informational content about the future behaviour 
of the caused yields.      
                                                          
21 Note that, in contrast to tests for contagion based on cross-market correlation measures, we do not need to adjust for 
the shift in volatility from the tranquil period to the crisis period. 
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Regarding the causal relationships running from EMU peripheral to EMU central 
countries, an increase in causality after the endogenously identified crisis is detected in six 
of the 10 possible cases (Panel A of Table 2). As for the causality linkages going from 
EMU central to EMU peripheral countries, in 10 out of the 15 cases where we find 
causality both in the tranquil and in the crisis period, we find that the relationship 
intensifies (Panel A of Table 3).  With regard to the causal relationships within EMU 
peripheral countries, we find evidence of significant relative rise in causality after the crisis 
in 12 out of the 14 possible cases (Panel B of Table 2). Finally, when examining the causal 
relationships within EMU central countries we conclude that they increase after the crisis in 
14 of the 21 possible cases (Panel B of Table 3).  
 
4.5. Contagion assessment 
From the above analysis we can conclude that, in the crisis period, not only do we find 
some new causality patterns which had been absent before its start, but also an 
intensification of causality in 70% of the cases which would allow us to establish that those 
linkages may be purely crisis-contingent.  
 
Specifically, causal relationships running from EMU peripheral countries record an 
important increase in the crisis period: not only relationships within peripheral countries 
(Figure 3b shows six new linkages), but also causal relationships running from EMU 
peripheral to EMU central countries (Figure 3a displays 17 new causality patterns). This 
suggests that the problems of peripheral countries can spill over not only to other 
peripheral countries but also to EMU central countries since some of these banks (mostly 
German and French banks) are highly exposed to the debt of peripheral countries (see 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013). Moreover, several studies show that sovereign 
bond yields are not only driven by country-specific risk factors but that they are also 
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significantly affected by global risk factors [see Groba et. al. (2013) and Dieckmann and 
Plank (2011) among them]. These global risk factors reflect global investors’ risk aversion, 
since in times of uncertainty, they become more risk averse and the “flight-to-safety” 
motive favors bonds of countries that are generally regarded to have a low default risk (e.g. 
during the crisis Germany experienced one of its lowest yields’ levels in history). Therefore, 
an increase in the Granger-causality of bond yields from peripheral to central countries 
might also reflect a general increase in investors’ risk aversion which might have driven an 
increase of yields in those countries. Indeed, 10-year yields spreads over Germany of 
Austrian, Finish, French and Dutch government’s bonds achieved a maximum level of 183, 
83, 189 and 84 basis points (in November 2011 in the first three countries and in April 
2012 in the case of the Netherlands, see Figure 2) while the credit rating provided by the 
three most important agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch) at the same date 
was, like in Germany, the highest one. The reason behind sovereign risk rise in central 
countries, triggered by the behaviour of peripheral countries, can be related to herding 
behavior or panic among investors which leads to what is named by the literature as “pure 
contagion” (see Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2014). Besides, the fact that tensions in 
sovereign debt markets also spread to EMU central countries is also stressed by the nine 
new linkages that appear (see Figures 4a and 4b) both in the causal relationships running 
from EMU central to EMU peripheral countries and between EMU central countries.  
 
In our view, these 41 new causality patterns out of the 101 causal relationships that exist in 
the crisis period within the 11 euro area countries analyzed (which were absent before the 
break date, determined endogenously for each causal relationship), together with the 
intensification of the causal relationship in 42 of the 60 cases in which we find causality 
both in the tranquil and in the crisis period, can be considered an important operative 
measure of contagion consistent with both our definition and the literature, as they 
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represent additional linkages during crisis periods in excess of those that arise during non-
crisis periods; see for example, Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Masson (1999), Pericoli and 
Sbracia (2003) or Dungey et al. (2006).  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has three main objectives: to test for the existence of possible Granger-causal 
relationships between the evolution of the yield of bonds issued by both peripheral and 
central EMU countries, to determine endogenously the breakpoints in the evolution of 
those relationships and to detect contagion episodes according to an operative definition: 
an abnormal increase in the number or in the intensity of causal relationships compared 
with that of tranquil periods, triggered by an endogenously detected shock. 
 
The most important results that emerge from our analysis are the following: (1) Around 
two thirds out of the total endogenously identified breakpoints occur after November 
2009, when Papandreou’s government revealed that its finances were far worse than 
previous announcements, suggesting that most of the breakpoints can be explained by 
systemic shocks directly connected to the euro sovereign debt crisis. (2) The number of 
causal relationships increases as the financial and sovereign debt crisis unfolds in the euro 
area, and causality patterns after the break dates are more frequent when EMU peripheral 
countries are the triggers. (3) In the crisis period we find evidence of 101 causal 
relationships: 41 represent new causality linkages and 60 are patterns that already existed in 
the tranquil period. However, we find an intensification of the causal relationship in 42 out 
of the 60 cases. In our opinion, these 41 new causality patterns, together with the 
intensification of the causal relationship in 70% of the cases can be considered an 
important operative measure of contagion that is consistent with the definition we have 
proposed. 
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Regarding policy implications, our results seem to indicate that EMU has brought about 
strong interlinkages of the participating countries which are reasonable within a group of 
countries that share an exchange rate agreement (a common currency in the case of the 
euro area) and where financial crises tend to be clustered (see Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). 
Therefore, we consider that our results might have some practical meaning for investors 
and policymakers, as well as some theoretical insights for academic scholars interested in 
the behaviour of EMU sovereign debt markets. Our methodology could be used as a tool 
to provide information regarding the drivers and the time-varying intensity of crisis 
transmission, in the euro area sovereign debt markets, after a shock, which is an important 
question that can help policymakers to react in the future in order to avoid another. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that our analysis is devoted to bivariate series analysis. The 
extension to multivariate series analysis is reserved for future research. In view of the 
encouraging results of the present study, some optimism about the benefits from 
implementing this analysis seems justified. 
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Figure 1. Daily 10-year sovereign yields in EMU-11 countries: 1999-2012 
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Figure 2. Daily 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany: 1999-2012 
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Figure 3: Causal relationships from EMU Peripheral countries. 
 
Figure 3a: Causal relationships from EMU Peripheral to Central countries         Figure 3b: Causal relationships within EMU Peripheral countries 
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Figure 4: Causal relationships from EMU Central countries. 
 
Figure 4a: Causal relationships from EMU Central to Peripheral countries         Figure4b: Causal relationships within EMU Central countries 
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Table 1: Causal relationships’ break datesa 
Causal relationship Break date Causal relationship Break date 
Panel A: 07/03/2008: ECB increases interest rates by 25 
basis points 
Panel B:  09/15/2008: Lehman Brothers files for 
bankruptcy 
PT → NL 07/04/2008 PT → IT 09/15/2008 
SP → NL 07/04/2008 PT → GE 10/08/2008 
FR → NL 07/04/2008 SP → GE 10/08/2008 
GE → FI 07/04/2008 FR → FI 10/08/2008 
GE → NL 07/04/2008 SP → IT 10/08/2008 
NL → GE 07/04/2008 NL → FI 10/28/2008 
IE → NL 07/04/2008 BE → GE 11/04/2008 
IT → GE 07/04/2008 IE → IT 11/14/2008 
GR → GE 07/04/2008 GR → IT 11/28/2008 
GR → NL 07/04/2008   
FR → PT 07/04/2008   
FR→ SP 07/04/2008   
IE → GE 07/04/2008   
BE → NL 07/24/2008   
Panel C:  November 2009: Papandreou's government 
reveals that its finances were far worse than previous 
announcements 
Panel D:  04/23/2010: Greece seeks financial support 
BE → PT 11/30/2009 IT → AT 05/05/2010 
IT → PT 12/03/2009 FR → IT 05/07/2010 
IT→ SP 12/03/2009 GE → IT 05/10/2010 
GR → AT 12/21/2009 GR→ SP 05/10/2010 
PT → FR 12/21/2009 NL → IT 05/10/2010 
SP → FR 12/21/2009 IT → NL 05/10/2010 
Panel E: 11/21/2010: Ireland seeks financial support 
 
SP → AT 05/10/2010  
FI → PT 11/21/2010 FR → AT 05/10/2010 
FI→ SP 11/21/2010 FR → BE 05/11/2010 
BE → SP 11/21/2010 FI → IT 05/11/2010  
FI → IE 11/21/2010 FI → GR 05/11/2010 
BE → IE 11/21/2010 AT → GR 05/11/2010 
NL → IE 11/21/2010 AT → PT 
 
05/11/2010 
AT → BE 11/21/2010 BE → IT 05/11/2010 
AT → NL 11/21/2010 BE → GR 05/11/2010 
BE → FR 11/21/2010 IE → BE 05/11/2010 
FI → FR 11/21/2010 IE → GR 05/12/2010  
IT → IE 11/21/2010 IT → GR 05/12/2010 
PT → IE 11/21/2010 SP → GR 05/12/2010 
SP → IE 11/21/2010   
SP→ PT 11/21/2010   
GE → IE 11/22/2010   
AT → SP 11/23/2010   
AT → IT 11/23/2010   
GE → BE 11/24/2010   
NL → BE 11/24/2010   
NL → FR 11/24/2010   
FI → BE 11/24/2010   
SP → BE 11/24/2010   
GR → BE 11/24/2010   
IT → BE 11/24/2010   
PT → BE 11/24/2010   
AT → FI 11/25/2010   
NL→ SP 11/25/2010   
GE → GR 12/10/2010   
NL → GR 12/10/2010   
 
 
                                                          
a Notes: Five triggering events explain 70% of total break dates. 
AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT, and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, respectively. 
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Table 2: Causality running from EMU Peripheral countriesb 
 
Panel A: Causality running from EMU Peripheral to Central countries  
 Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period  Break date Causality 
Changes 
IE → AT No Yes 09/18/2009 New 
IE → BE No Yes 05/11/2010 New 
IE → FI Yes Yes 01/29/2009 Intensification 
IE → FR No Yes 03/23/2010 New 
IE → GE Yes Yes 07/04/2008 Reduction 
IE → NL No Yes 07/04/2008 New 
IT → AT Yes Yes 05/05/2010 Reduction 
IT → BE Yes Yes 11/24/2010 Intensification 
IT → FI Yes Yes 07/04/2010 Intensification 
IT → FR No Yes 01/05/2009 New 
IT → GE Yes Yes 07/04/2008 Reduction 
IT → NL No No 05/10/2010 - 
GR → AT No Yes 12/21/2009 New 
GR → BE No Yes 11/24/2010 New 
GR → FI No Yes 07/04/2010 New 
GR → FR No Yes 01/06/2009 New 
GR → GE No No 07/04/2008 - 
GR → NL No No 07/04/2008 - 
PT → AT No Yes 01/06/2009 New 
PT → BE Yes Yes 11/24/2010 Intensification 
PT → FI Yes Yes 07/04/2010 Reduction 
PT → FR No Yes 12/21/2009 New 
PT → GE No Yes 10/08/2008 New 
PT → NL No Yes 07/04/2008 New 
SP → AT Yes Yes 05/10/2010 Intensification 
SP → BE No Yes 11/24/2010 New 
SP → FI No Yes 07/04/2010 New 
SP → FR Yes Yes 12/21/2009 Intensification 
SP → GE No Yes 10/08/2008 New 
SP → NL No Yes 07/04/2008 New 
 
Panel B: Causality running within EMU Peripheral countries  
 Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period  Break date Causality 
changes 
IE → IT Yes Yes 11/14/2008 Intensification 
IE → GR No Yes 05/12/2010 New 
IE → PT Yes Yes 06/22/2009 Intensification 
IE→ SP Yes Yes 03/02/2009 Intensification 
IT → IE Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
IT → GR Yes Yes 05/12/2010 Intensification 
IT → PT Yes Yes 12/03/2009 Reduction 
IT→ SP Yes Yes 12/03/2009 Intensification 
GR → IE No Yes 07/05/2010 New 
GR → IT No Yes 11/28/2008 New 
GR → PT Yes Yes 02/02/2010 Intensification 
GR→ SP No Yes 05/10/2010 New 
PT → IE No Yes 11/21/2010 New 
PT → IT Yes Yes 09/15/2008 Reduction 
PT → GR Yes Yes 08/05/2010 Intensification 
PT→ SP Yes Yes 15/01/2010 Intensification 
SP → IE No Yes 11/21/2010 New 
SP → IT Yes Yes 10/08/2008 Intensification 
SP → GR Yes Yes 05/12/2010 Intensification 
SP→ PT Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
b Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT, and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, respectively. Bold values indicate absence of 
Granger-causality. 
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Table 3: Causality running from EMU Central countriesc 
 
Panel A: Causality running from EMU Central to Peripheral countries 
 Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period  Break date Causality 
changes 
AT → IE Yes No 07/05/2010 - 
AT → IT No Yes 11/23/2010 New 
AT → GR No No 05/11/2010 - 
AT → PT No Yes 05/11/2010 New 
AT → SP Yes Yes 11/23/2010 Intensification 
BE → IE Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
BE → IT Yes Yes 05/11/2010 Intensification 
BE → GR Yes No 05/11/2010 - 
BE → PT No Yes 11/30/2009 New 
BE → SP No Yes 11/21/2010 New 
FI → IE Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
FI → IT Yes Yes 05/11/2010 Intensification 
FI → GR Yes Yes 05/11/2010 Intensification 
FI → PT No Yes 11/21/2010 New 
FI→ SP Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
FR → IE No Yes 07/05/2010 New 
FR → IT Yes Yes 05/07/2010 Intensification 
FR → GR No No 05/03/2010 - 
FR → PT Yes No 07/04/2008 - 
FR→ SP Yes Yes 07/04/2008 Intensification 
GE → IE Yes Yes 11/22/2010 Reduction 
GE → IT No Yes 05/10/2010 New 
GE → GR No Yes 12/10/2010 New 
GE → PT Yes Yes 01/08/2008 Reduction 
GE→ SP Yes Yes 01/14/2010 Intensification 
NL → IE Yes No 11/21/2010 - 
NL → IT Yes Yes 05/10/2010 Reduction 
NL → GR No Yes 12/10/2010 New 
NL → PT Yes Yes 08/18/2008 Reduction 
NL→ SP Yes Yes 11/25/2010 Reduction 
 
Panel B: Causality running within EMU Central countries  
 Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period  Break date Causality 
changes 
AT → BE Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
AT → FI No Yes 11/25/2010 New 
AT → FR Yes Yes 06/10/2008 Intensification 
AT → GE Yes Yes 07/01/2008 Intensification 
AT → NL No Yes 11/21/2010 New 
BE → AT Yes Yes 06/01/2009 Reduction 
BE → FI Yes Yes 06/04/2010 Intensification 
BE → FR Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
BE → GE Yes Yes 11/04/2008 Reduction 
BE → NL No Yes 07/24/2008 New 
FI → AT Yes Yes 05/01/2009 Intensification 
FI → BE No Yes 11/24/2010 New 
FI → FR Yes Yes 11/21/2010 Intensification 
FI → GE Yes Yes 07/01/2008 Intensification 
FI → NL No Yes 06/04/2010 New 
FR → AT No Yes 05/10/2010 New 
FR → BE Yes Yes 05/11/2010 Reduction 
FR → FI Yes Yes 10/08/2008 Reduction 
FR → GE Yes Yes 07/01/2008 Intensification 
FR → NL Yes Yes 07/04/2008 Intensification 
GE → AT Yes Yes 06/06/2009 Intensification 
GE → BE Yes Yes 11/24/2010 Intensification 
GE → FI No Yes 07/04/2008 New 
GE → FR No Yes 02/19/2008 New 
GE → NL No Yes 07/04/2008 New 
NL → AT Yes Yes 01/06/2009 Intensification 
NL → BE Yes Yes 11/24/2010 Intensification 
NL → FI Yes Yes 10/28/2008 Reduction 
NL → FR Yes Yes 11/24/2010 Reduction 
NL → GE Yes Yes 07/04/2008 Intensification 
 
                                                          
c Notes:  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT, and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, respectively. 
 Bold values indicate absence of Granger-causality.  
 
